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United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management
Hearing on Federally Incurred Cost of Regulatory Changes and
How Such Changes are Made
July 17, 2019
Prepared Statement of
Richard W. Parker, Professor of Law
University of Connecticut School of Law
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hassan, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for giving me the opportunity to testify before you today. I have been asked to testify on
the adequacy of current safeguards and checks on agency power in the current regulatory
process; and to provide my assessment of the likely impact of further limiting federal
agencies’ ability to make regulatory changes in response to stakeholder input or emerging
challenges.
I am a tenured professor at University of Connecticut School of Law. I have worked in
federal agencies for five years, taught administrative law for 24 years, and published
journal articles on the rulemaking process. I also have convened and facilitated
negotiated rulemaking exercises for the Department of Energy and the Department of
Transportation, and I serve on the Council of the ABA Administrative Law Section.
However, the views expressed today are entirely my own. I am not employed by – or
beholden to -- any organization that holds a vested interest in the subject matter of
today’s hearing.
I understand this Subcommittee is particularly interested in exploring issues raised by a
recent report by the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), which has a representative testifying
here today, and which I read as raising three main concerns:1
First, PLF quotes a recent study by the Mercatus Center to the effect that federal
regulations are costing the U.S. economy four trillion dollars a year. This exorbitant cost
is cited as evidence of a regulatory state that is out of control and needs to be reined in.
Second, PLF claims that many of these costly regulations are issued unconstitutionally -in violation of the Appointments Clause -- by career civil servants who are merely agency
employees and not Officers of the United States as required by the Constitution. PLF
cites the example of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which has issued literally
hundreds of rules over the signature of Leslie Kux and certain other senior career civil
servants.
Third, PLF and other regulatory critics are worried by the fact that many agency
regulations and regulatory changes invoke broadly worded statutory delegations of
authority from laws that may be decades old. Here, the concern is that the drafters of the
original authorizing legislation may not have anticipated the specific situations for which
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agencies issue or amend regulations under the authority of old statutes many years later,
raising issues about the accountability of those later regulations and spending programs.
Frankly, I do not share these concerns. In fact, for reasons I will explain in my remarks, I
find these concerns entirely without merit.
To begin with, there is no sound reason to believe that regulations in aggregate are
costing Americans anywhere near $4 trillion a year. I and other scholars have thoroughly
debunked cost estimates of half that amount, and even President Trump’s Office of
Management and Budget acknowledges that the benefits of regulation far outweigh their
costs.2
The $4 trillion regulatory cost figure comes from a single unpublished study by the
Mercatus Center, a libertarian-leaning advocacy center. That study reaches its $4 trillion
estimate not by actually measuring the cumulative cost of regulation, but by constructing
a hypothetical model of the economy that assumes what it ought to prove: that regulation
always hampers economic growth and never promotes such growth (for example, by
keeping workers healthy and by preventing massive fraud that causes market meltdowns
and recessions). In other words, the Mercatus study employs a tautological theoretical
model that builds its desired conclusions into its core assumptions. And the costs it finds
are not out-of-pocket costs of real people, but utterly speculative opportunity costs in
form of foregone economic growth.
The implausibility of its core premise can be seen by reading the newspaper. The study
assumes an economy in which regulatory compliance costs starve industry of the cash
needed for innovation and investment that leads to growth. Newspapers, however, report
a quite different, and happier, reality – an economy of full employment in which many
US firms are so flush with surplus cash that they are buying back their own stock for
want of better options.3
After conjuring $4 trillion in phantom regulatory costs, PLF next leaps to the conclusion
that the FDA is issuing “unconstitutional” rules because they appear in the Federal
Register over the signature of senior career civil servants. This claim reads way too
much into a signature. It also reveals a misunderstanding of how the administrative
process actually works. What matters to accountability in the rulemaking process is not
who signs a rule, but who is required to review and sign off on the rule before it can be
signed. To take a simple example: the “Deeming Rule” on “vaping” of which PLF
complains in its report (and lawsuit) may have been signed by Leslie Kux, a senior civil
servant; but if that rule followed normal procedures, it was reviewed and cleared by
multiple offices within the FDA before going up the chain of command to be reviewed
and then approved by the FDA Commissioner. After that, it would be reviewed and
approved by the Office of the Secretary of HHS. Indeed, for a rule of this consequence, it
would have been approved only after several face to face meetings with both the FDA
2
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Commissioner and the Secretary. After that, since it was deemed a “significant” rule, it
would have been reviewed and cleared by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget, which is headed by an
advice-and-consent political appointee who answers directly to the President. During
OMB’s review the rule would be cleared by other federal agencies. Only after clearing
these multiple levels of review by political appointees (with the possibility of rejection or
amendment at each stage) would the rule be issued -- over the signature of Leslie Kux, a
career civil servant.
These higher-level reviews and approvals may be cursory, deep or in-between -depending on the salience of the rule, the people involved in the rulemaking process, the
level of trust they have in each other, and the management style of the leadership. The
fact remains: at the end of the day the rule goes out if and only if all these political
overseers approve it. And these political overseers are accountable to Congress, to the
President, and ultimately to taxpayers, for each and every rule they clear for issuance.
The buck stops with them. The same analysis applies to the other rules of the FDA and
the other Executive Branch departments and agencies.
Does this mean the vaping rule is good policy? Not necessarily. Agencies may make
errors even after multiple levels of review. But the remedy for those who believe a rule
to be misguided is to challenge the rule’s policy choice as arbitrary and capricious in a
court of law. The signature appearing at the end of the rule is beside the point.
The final concern I have been asked to address today is a deeper and more substantive
one: the concern that many agencies issue sometimes costly rules under statutory
delegations of authority that are old – and broad. Is this a bad thing? I do not believe it
is. Indeed, I would suggest that broad delegations of authority are a salutary and
necessary thing, and, in any event, are within Congress’s discretion. Two simple
examples will illustrate the point.
The Public Health Service Act, first passed in 1944, provides that: “(1) Regulations
prescribed under this section may provide for the apprehension and examination of any
individual reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease in a
qualifying stage . . .”4 No one had heard of Ebola when this Act was passed in 1944.
Should the CDC be required to go back to Congress to get a specific authorization to
address Ebola before responding to the risks it poses to our health? I believe the answer
is clearly no.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) sets auto safety standards
under a delegation which provides that: “The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe
motor vehicle safety standards. Each standard shall be practicable, meet the need for
motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms.”5 That’s broad language. But how
much narrower could the delegation be without getting Congress in way over its head,
technically? Over 40,000 Americans lost their lives in car crashes last year: equivalent to
thirteen 9/11 tragedies per year. New advances in collision avoidance technology now
under development could save thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of lives a year.
Should Congress take over the job of deciding exactly which of these life-saving
technologies to build into regulatory standards for the auto industry of the future?
4
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These examples involve regulations of private sector conduct, but comparable
complexities attend the administration of Medicare, Medicaid and many other benefits
programs. They illustrate why I believe congressional micromanagement of agency
rulemaking simply does not work. I have studied and worked with regulations for most
of my career. One thing I can say with assurance about regulations is that most of them
grapple with issues that are highly technical and complex. But extreme technical
complexity does not play to Congress’s strengths. Congress is comprised of a relatively
small number of generalists, whereas agencies are able to bring to bear large numbers of
specialized in-house experts on the problems they address. Congress also lacks either
time, staff, or adequate procedures to undertake the kind of detailed fact-gathering,
analysis, and stakeholder involvement in the regulatory process that agencies routinely
allow -- through public hearings, expert workshops, notice and comment rulemaking,
negotiated rulemaking, advisory committees, and regulatory analysis.
Moreover, Congress does not require itself to prepare a detailed analysis demonstrating
that the benefits of the statutes it enacts justify their costs, as executive branch agencies
are required to do with their major rules. Nor does Congress bind itself to respond in
detail to the comments and objections it receives from stakeholders and the public about
the draft laws on which it deliberates. By contrast, agencies must consider and respond to
the views of the public on pre-promulgation drafts of the rules they issue, or else run the
risk of reversal when challenged by stakeholders in court. More fundamentally, there is
the fact that agencies can be challenged in court for issuing standards that are arbitrary
and capricious. Congress faces no comparable check.
Ultimately, of course, Congress has the final say on all agency regulations and that is as it
should be. Congress writes the laws that the agencies must implement. Congress can
review and reject any agency rule that Congress disagrees with, following expedited
procedures with no possibility of filibuster.6 Congress controls the appropriations of
agencies. And Congress can require agencies to account for their rules and actions in
oversight hearings such as this one.
Thus, even though agencies obviously lack traditional electoral accountability, federal
agencies are accountable to the public in far more direct, material and practical ways –
directly in the rulemaking process and indirectly through White House, Congressional
and judicial review.
In sum: the agencies I have studied and worked with are not the rogue elephants that
some regulatory critics like to pretend they are. They are subject to multiple checks and
balances as they try to protect the American people from a wide variety of harms that
free-market actors would otherwise impose on them in the course of seeking profits. The
risks these agencies are trying to manage are often major risks of harm to public health,
safety, the environment or the economy. They are risks, moreover, from which markets
cannot and will not protect us without the intervention of government.
Sometimes agencies stray off course and need to be checked. More often they simply
need resources, support and a reasonable level of discretion to make sound policy on
what often are highly complex issues of fact and law.
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